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Cognitive Abduction and the Study
of Visual Culture
Maŕıa G. Navarro and Noemi de Haro Garćıa
Abstract. In this paper art history and visual studies, the disciplines that
study visual culture, are presented as a field whose conjectural paradigm can
be used to understand the epistemic problems associated with abduction. In
order to do so, significant statements, concepts and arguments from the work
of several specialists in this field have been highlighted. Their analysis shows
the fruitfulness and potential for understanding the study of visual culture
as a field that is interwoven with the assumptions of abductive cognition.
1 Introduction
Divergence and consensus are constants in the study of abduction. There are
divergences in the exact meaning of the term, but a great consensus on the
strong connection of abduction with many disciplines. Magnani [29] has jus-
tified and documented all kinds of evidence about the relationship between
abductive reasoning and disciplines such as philosophy, legal reasoning, Ar-
tificial Intelligence, cognitive sciences, narrative reasoning, decision making,
emotional cognition, etc. It is thus reasonable to assume that if abduction is
so important as an interplay between this and many other fields it is because
cognition in all living beings manifests a clear abductive mark. The idea of
‘abductive cognition’ has been shown to be important thanks to the contri-
bution of Magnani to the vast and complex history of abduction studies.
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Walton [47] affirms that abduction is a process of hypothesis formation
that is used at the discovery stage of scientific investigation, but we think
that it is also a source for a better understanding of both the theoretical and
practical dimensions in the study of the humanities. Here we will analyse
the presence of abductive cognition in a field of the humanities that has not
been explored sufficiently: the disciplines that study visual culture. These
are art history and visual studies. It can be said that, in the long tradition
of art history, research has been centred on some cultural objects, including
some objects of visual culture, that have been selected according to aesthetic
criteria. As Dikovitskaya [9] has shown, the ‘cultural turn’ has provoked im-
portant changes in the study of the visual such as the marriage between art
history and cultural studies that has led to the appearance of visual studies.
The interdisciplinary field of visual studies examines the role of all images in
culture, trying to go beyond the limitations imposed by aesthetic criteria on
the object of the discipline of art history as researchers like Vega [43] have
stressed, and claiming that the study of the experience of the visual has to
be contextual, ideological and political. Thus visual culture is (in whole or
in part) the object of study both of art history and visual studies. Therefore
in order to analyse the reasoning process used to think about this object,
both disciplines are to be taken into account. As we will show, the abductive
reasoning model, which can be more clearly identified in the work of some
contemporary specialists in visual studies, is also present in the research of
the founders of art history.
The purpose of this article is to explain why research in visual studies
must be taken into account in studies in abduction. In order to sustain our
thesis, we will establish several conceptual analogies to link both research
fields. This will shed a new light on both, and show that abduction is one of
the principal characters in the study of the visual. A broad set of concepts
could potentially be used to do this, but we will focus on:
1. Conjectural paradigm and re-creative synthesis / inference to the best
explanation, helicoid abductive reasoning.
2. Empathy, pathosformel, empathetic response / embodiment.
3. The combination of theoretical and manipulative abduction in the study
of the visual.
From this analogical reasoning, three consequences are to follow: the first
presents abduction as the logical pattern inherent in interpretation. The sec-
ond is related to perception understood as a limited process. The activity of
interpretation can be presented both as a process and as the result of a process
where abduction is constantly present. It may appear either as theoretical ab-
duction, as model-based abduction or even as manipulative abduction. The
third has to do with the inferential structure of perceived objects. The use
of abductive reasoning understood as epistemic change, models the incor-
poration of new beliefs. The interpretative process and product, the bodily
involvement in visual culture experience and even visual culture itself, can be
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understood as products that have an inferential structure or that even imply
an inferential play.
2 Conjectural Paradigm and Re-creative Synthesis
The presence of abductive reasoning in scientific practices related to the arts
has been identified in studies that were oriented towards the establishment of
a relationship between the interpretation of the arts and semiotics. Ginzburg
[16] included the method of the connoisseur Giovanni Morelli along with
those of Freud and Sherlock Holmes (or better, Conan Doyle’s method) in
his essays about how in the late 19th century a theoretical model for the
construction of knowledge emerged in the sphere of the social sciences, the
conjectural paradigm. The methods of Morelli, Freud and Doyle had some-
thing in common: they were based on taking marginal, irrelevant details as
revealing clues to forge their conclusions, and they shared the model of med-
ical semiotics or symptomatology. But the roots of the ‘semiotic’ approach
were deeper; Ginzburg traced them back to forms of explanation and divina-
tion that could be oriented towards past, present or future (jurisprudence,
medicine and divination proper). Furthermore, his hypothesis was that the
origin of the diagnosis from signs or symptoms lay in the practices of long-ago
hunters and the ‘reading’ of animal tracks.
This kind of knowledge based on conjecture and speculation (born of expe-
rience, of the concrete and individual) responded to a paradigm that differed
from the more prestigious scientific one, but it was used by all kinds of people.
In the 18th century the situation changed when the bourgeoisie appropriated
for itself much of the knowledge of artisans and peasants. The Encyclopédie
is signalled by Ginzburg as the symbol and chief instrument in this offensive,
with the novel and the literature of imagination as a substitute and refor-
mulation of initiation rites, giving access to experience in general. Because
of all this, the conjectural paradigm enjoyed an unexpected success. In addi-
tion, in the 18th and 19th centuries the constellation of conjectural disciplines
changed, many new ones were born, with medicine assuming a preeminent
position amogn them. All the ‘human sciences’ attempted to relate them-
selves to it explicitly or implicitly, and they did so by accepting the medical
conjectural paradigm of semiotics. Medicine, and thus symptom deciphering,
was well known by all the three authors mentioned by Ginzburg as well as by
Peirce [33]. This knowledge probably helped them to formulate their methods
according to the conjectural paradigm of medicine in a more accurate and
convincing way. In so doing, their contributions to their disciplines gained a
better ‘methodological reputation’ so to say.
Many of the controversies related to authorship identification of artworks
(the main issue addressed by connoisseurs like Morelli) use the two types of
hypothetical reasoning referred to by the historian of science Lipton [27]. He
distinguishes between inference to the likeliest and to the loveliest explanation.
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It is not clear wether the inference about the question of authorship precedes
explanation or not. The use of inference to the best explanation (IBE) in the
case of authorship identification and, more generally, in the study of visual cul-
ture, inverts the usual point of view about the relationship between inference
and explanation. According to the natural point of view, or to common sense,
inference would precede explanation. In spite of this, the reasoning model im-
plicit in the ‘Morelli method’ consists of analysing to what extent the evidence
can explain a set of hypotheses. In this model therefore, IBE, and thus the ex-
planation, comes before the inference.
Perhaps because of the impact of Ginzburg’s essays, the ‘Morelli method’ is
usually the only one mentioned when abductive reasoning is presented in re-
lation with art history. Moreover Morelli is generally the only reference cited
to the studies on art when the influence of Peirce on contemporary thought
is debated. For further details see Laine Ketner [24]. Besides the influence
of structuralism and poststructuralism on the work of many art historians
and specialists in the field of cultural and visual studies, from the second
half of the 20th century on, authors like Holly [23] have noted that some of
the issues that were addressed by early semioticians were already being ex-
plored at the same time by art historians like Riegl and Panofsky. According
to Holly Panofsky was a keen student of semioticians’ works and shared cer-
tain epistemological predispositions with semiotics. For Argan [4] Panofsky’s
method, iconology, confronted the problem of art as that of linguistic struc-
tures much more than the formalism of Wölfflin. Perhaps that is why Argan
affirmed that Panofsky was the Saussure of art history. Although, as Hasen-
mueller [22] has noted, there are problems in simply calling Panofsky’s work
semiotic, as semiotics and iconology have a common interest in uncovering
the deep structure of cultural products. Iconology, like early semiotics was
devoted to exposing the existence of the conscious and unconscious rules of
formation that encircle a language and make possible its sudden emergence
-both visual and linguistic- on the surface of human history. For further de-
tails see Holly [23].
But what interests us here is that Panofsky’s writings can be taken as an
index of how he reached his conclusions. Panofsky’s objective remained the
value judgment he called ‘re-creative synthesis’. For him the definition of an
artwork as a ‘man-made object demanding to be experienced aesthetically’
confronted the researcher with what he considered was the ‘basic difference
between the humanities and natural science’. The scientist dealt with natu-
ral phenomena and could at once proceed to analyse them. In contrast the
humanist dealt with human actions and creations and had to engage in a
mental process of a synthetic and subjective character. Humanists had ‘men-
tally to re-enact the actions and to re-create the creations’, and it was by this
process that the real objects of the humanities came into being. According
to Panofsky [32] the object of the humanities, and more precisely that of
art history, was the result of this re-creative synthesis which was always in
process. That is why he explained that the art historian did not constitute
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his object through a re-creative synthesis first, followed by archaeological re-
search. For him these two stages did not occur successively, but took place
rather in an interwoven manner: the re-creative synthesis served as a basis
for the archaeological research, but the latter served in its turn for the pro-
cess of re-creation. Both stages were only conceived separately in theory (as
a way to explain his method) but in practice they were recognised and used
to qualify and correct each other in a reciprocal relationship.
This process is analogous to the abductive reasoning model described by
the Ducth linguist Gorleé [20] as a method in interlinguistic translation. The
necessary application of this method is manifest in the case of descriptive
translation, whose objective is translation as a product. As an example, she
mentions within this category translation understood as transference. There
similarities are recognised that justify a translation which is considered valid
in a transitory or derived way because words refer to specific cultural activi-
ties. In this sense, the explanatory hypothesis used in previous steps affects
further research and interpretation procedures. That is why some authors,
such as Tursman [42] consider that the use of abductive processes in this
kind of studies is better described with the explanatory metaphor of the fig-
ure of the helicoid than with a linear figure. This is because there would be
always something to go back to, something that could, in some way, be redis-
covered. Gorleé [21] affirms that Peirce’s logic-semiotic method can be fully
applied to the identification, description and analysis of translation as a men-
tal experiment in the generation of meaning, where a hypothesis generated
by abduction is verified in a reiterative way.
The helicoid figure referred to by Gorleé can help us to evaluate the sig-
nificance of abductive reasoning in the cases of Panofsky and Morelli. On the
one hand, the affirmations of the latter are based on an abduction process
that goes from effects to possible causes. On the other hand, abduction in
Panofsky is linked to belief revision. In other words, it has to do with an
understanding of abductive reasoning as ampliative and non-monotonic. It
is evident that in both authors the use of abduction led them to infer hy-
potheses that could not be classically deduced from the given facts. In spite
of that, Morelli used abductive reasoning to make irrefutable statements on
the authorship of artworks just as if they were the result of deduction. So,
even if both Morelli and Panofsky used the same type of reasoning they did
not evaluate in the same way the impact of their statements on the disci-
pline of art history. Morelli was deeply fascinated by the power of apodictic
demonstrations of objects whose meaning, in fact, is partially veiled as are
the objects themselves. In contrast, some of Panofsky’s affirmations indicate
that he was more aware of the always-in-process nature of interpretations of
cultural objects.
The authors Kohlas, Berzati and Haenni [25] affirmed that abductive ex-
planations are in general neither complete nor sound, and that for this reason
they are not fully appropriate for model-based diagnosis. Nevertheless model-
based diagnosis has been used in combination with abductive reasoning in
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many research projects that deal with medical diagnosis. We share to some
extent the scepticism of these authors, and propose the potential of the analy-
sis of disciplines that study visual culture to analyse model-based abduction.
The paradoxical situation of objects whose meaning is always partially
veiled can be better understood if we turn to computational studies. Accord-
ing to Thagard [41], this field provides a model for a better understanding of
the hidden meanings of the data themselves and of the hidden meaning given
to them by the producers of those data. Thagard distinguished four types
of abduction: simple (which produces hypotheses about individual objects);
existential (that postulates the existence of previously unknown objects);
rule-forming (that produces rules that explain other rules), and analogical
(that uses past cases of hypothesis formation to generate hypotheses similar
to existing ones). But it would be difficult and inconsistent to classify the
use of abduction in the construction of interpretation of cultural objects (by
Morelli, Panofsky or any other interpreter) in just one of these four types.
Abduction is described as a useful mechanism for explaining knowledge
acquisition in areas where empirical methods for testing hypotheses are not
available, hypothesis, for example, about past or unique events. This infer-
ential process is irreducible to other types of inference as Hintikka affirms. It
has been used to describe the cognitive processes that intervene in scientific
discoveries in experimental sciences. For further details see Rivadulla [38].
Although the link between this reasoning model and experimental sciences is
unquestionable, we think that it has been overvalued. This is evident if we
take into account the fact that scientific discovery and the logic of invention
are not exclusive of experimental sciences. If abduction is a particular type of
argument or epistemic process that attempts to model the incorporation of
new beliefs as Aliseda [1] maintains, this process would be one of the principal
characters in other kinds of research such as the study of visual culture.
These pages try to explore this tentative hypothesis by presenting analo-
gies between the field of art history and visual studies, and abductive cogni-
tion. This is so because topics, inquiries and controversies in these disciplines
could not exist independently from the three types of hypothesis identified
by Peirce. In any case, they refer to facts or entities unobservable when the
hypothesis was formulated but observable later; or to entities or facts that
someone could observe in the past even though it is not possible to repeat
the observation now, because they are facts of the past; or to entities unob-
servable in practice. But analysis of studies of visual culture in the light of
abductive cognition is not only based on the Peircean definition of the types
of hypothesis. Peirce [33] also stated that all thinking is in signs, and signs
can be icons, indices, or symbols. All inference is a form of sign activity, where
the word sign includes feeling, image, conception, and other representation.
Along with these two arguments (one dealing with the different types of hy-
pothesis, and the other with inference as a form of sign activity), a third can
be found in Magnani [28] and Magnani and Li. Ping [30]. This author intro-
duces the concept of theoretical and manipulative abduction. He maintains
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that there are two kinds of theoretical abduction: sentential, related to logic
and to verbal/symbolic inferences, and model-based related to the exploita-
tion of models such as diagrams, pictures, etc. He reminds us that Peirce
considered any cognitive activity whatever to be inferential. This included
perceptual knowledge and subconscious cognitive activity, not only conscious
abstract thought.
3 Empathy as Embodied Mechanism
Elements in the style of paintings were considered by Morelli, his heir Bernard
Berenson and other connoisseurs as unconscious marks that identified their
authors. The idea behind the assumptions of these connoisseurs was, as
Friedländer [13] pointed out, that creative individuality had an unchange-
able core and that the artist remained fundamentally the same. Something,
therefore, that could not be lost revealed itself in his very expression. In spite
of this, just as experience has shown (a well known example of this being the
development of the Rembrandt Research Project), this assumption has to
be taken carefully, as nothing prevents an artist from switching consciously
between different styles in a way similar to the choice of high or low style of
a rhetorician, according to the particular occasion of his speech.
In the writings of the scholars known as formalists, style was important
not because it was considered characteristic of an individual artist but be-
cause it was understood as the specific expression of an age. The most sig-
nificant representatives of the formalist stream, Riegl and Wölfflin, argued
that art offered unmediated sensory access to past world-views. If, according
to Ginzburg, Morelli took a prestigious model such as medicine to support
his attributions, the formalist authors and their interest in physiology and
psychology can be said to respond to a similar aspiration to gain theoretical
authority.
The authors and ideas that influenced formalist art historians most were
the German physicist and physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz, the psychol-
ogists Joahnn Fredrich Herbart, Theodor Lipps and Wilhelm Wundt, the
aesthetic theory of the sculptor Adolf Hildebrand and Konrad Fischer. Their
views formed the basis of the way Riegl and Wölffling understood art and its
changes over time. They thought that the development of art through history
responded to a process of development of vision that was analogous to the
development of psychology of perception in individuals. By studying vision
and the history of perception these authors focused on the relationship that
people had to their environment. For them physical involvement in artworks
provoked a sense of imitating the motion seen or implied in the work, and
this enhanced the spectator’s emotional responses to it. This idea was the
result of the influence of empathy theory on the work of these art historians.
The fundamental doctrine of empathy theory was that aesthetic experience
depended on the experiencing subject’s projection of bodily sensations and
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emotional memory on fundamental formal elements of experience, such as
lines and colours, and thus justified the interest in and need of formalist
analysis. Vischer [45] was the first to employ the term ‘Einfühlung’ in a doc-
toral thesis, meaning the physical responses generated by the observation
of paintings. Afterwards, Theodor Lipps, promoted this term and empathy
theory in works such as Die ästhetische Betrachtung und die bildende Kunst
[26]. Lipps was the supervisor of Wölfflin’s dissertation Prolegomena zu einer
Psychologie der Architektur [51] where the latter gave an ahistorical account
of how architectural forms are perceived. Following Lipps’ ideas, Wölffling
stated that forms had no expression by themselves. In reality this only hap-
pened when the viewer read the proportions and relations of forms according
to his own physiological and psychological constitution, endowing them with
something of his own body’s posture and mood.
In spite of the early influence it had on his work, Wölfflin would progres-
sively move away from empathy theory in order to explain stylistic changes
through time. In Rennaissance und Barock [50] he affirmed that changes in
style and in other spheres of life as well occurred because of changes in bodily
feeling. Later on, in Classic Art, he maintained that styles are conditioned by
the combination of two independent factors: changes in purely artistic forms
of vision, and changes in feelings and states of mind. Finally in his most
famous book Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Principles of Art History)
[49] he proposed a general set of descriptive terms to capture the artistic
visual forms of an age without proposing any further explanation. In the in-
troduction he criticised empathy theory arguing that when forms are read as
expressions of states of mind, we make the false assumption that the same
expressive methods are always available.
Following a process opposite to Wölfflin’s, another important formalist au-
thor Riegl rejected the application of empathy theory to art history in Stilfa-
gen (Problems of Style) [36]. His later work, however, would show implicitly
that he had came closer to it. For example, in Spätromische Kunstindustrie
(Late Roman Art Industry) [35], where he adopted the distinction between
tactile and optical perceptions, he accepted the assumptions of empathy the-
ory when he made the analogy between the apprehension of individual ob-
jects in the early haptic stage, and the sense we have of our own bodies. His
last major work Das Holländische Gruppenporträt (The Group Portraiture
of Holland) [37] focused on the paintings’ implicit viewer and this brought
Riegl closer to empathy theory. For Riegl Dutch paintings achieved coherence
only when the viewer involved himself with the psychic sphere represented in
them. According to this author, art in Holland was objective because it was
concerned with the psychological relationship between figures that were inde-
pendent from each other and from the viewer, a relationship that took place
at a particular moment in a particular place in the absence of the artist’s
subjective point of view.
Empathy was also among the interests of another major figure in the study
of the arts, Aby Warburg. He thought it was possible to demonstrate, for
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specific conditions of time and place, how the visual arts expressed the per-
ceptions and experiences of man. He analysed the representation of the move-
ment of the body, hair and garments in artworks of 15th century Florence
and traced back those movements in ancient art and also in contemporary
images. For Warburg the borrowing of artistic forms from Antiquity had to
do not just with forms, but was justified in terms of an affinity of expressive
need. The intensified mimicry of Antiquity, its postures and gestures, were
interpreted by Warburg as traces of violent passions experienced in the past,
which were used by following generations as a repertoire to represent specific
states of action and psychological arousal.
Warburg called these Pathosformel (‘pathos formula’ or ‘emotive formula’)
a name that emphasized the stereotypical and repetitive aspect of the imag-
ined subject the artist had to use to give expression to ‘life in movement’. This
term appeared for the first time in his essay on Dürer and Pagan Antiquity
where Warburg [48] traced back the iconographic theme of Dürer’s etchings
Orpheus to the ‘pathetic gestural language’ of the art of antiquity. He dis-
covered and traced this Pathosformel by scrutinizing all relevant evidence:
archives, family diaries, psychology, folklore, mythology, religion, philosophy,
ethnography, opera, astrology, etc. He even travelled to New Mexico to wit-
ness the ‘living paganism’ of the Pueblo Indians. All these interests gave form
to the collection of his library, with the Greek inscription MNEMOΣYNH
(Mnemosyne) above the door. As we will see later, the objects he named after
Mnemosyne, the mother of all muses, would play a fundamental role in the
development of his thought.
In The Power of Images Freedberg [12] described some of the recurrent
symptoms of emotional responses to paintings and sculptures throughout
history. He intended to draw attention towards the lack of interest that the
history of art had taken in doing any research on the subject. In that book
Freedberg referred to two kinds of response: direct and indirect, or unmedi-
ated and mediated. The first type of response seemed to be automatic and to
be predicated on immediate or felt bodily responses, and the second type was
mediated by concept, reflection and recollection. The first one can be said
to be common to all humans, and the other is influenced by social, cultural
and historical conditions. Could mediated response be understood as part of
Umberto Eco’s description of a hyper coded abduction?
To acknowledge the hermeneutic potential of the relationship between the
neuronal bases of response and their historical and cultural inflection, Freed-
berg [10] has engaged in interdisciplinary work with neuroscientists. The ob-
jective of this collaboration is to find physical evidence of how art engages
with the body and what the emotional responses that may ensue are. Of
course, he signals that the question of the relations between inner and out-
ward movement has a long tradition in the history of art and aesthetics
(mentioning the previously cited authors among others), and also the inter-
est in the arts of several neuroscientific works, but his intention is to discover
the neuroscientific resolution (or at least refinement) of some of the older
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intuitions, hypotheses and theories. His current work, therefore, deals with
the neural bases of empathy and the relationship between emotional and
motor responses to works of visual arts.
He has collaborated with neuroscientists such as Gallese who coined the
term ‘embodied simulation’ to refer to a common functional mechanism that
is the basis of both body awareness and basic forms of social understanding
[15]. One of the results of this collaboration is a paper on the neural basis of
motion, emotion, empathy and aesthetic experience. For further details see
Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese [11]. In addition his work with neuroscientists
Battaglia and Lisanby [5] examines the corticomotor networks involved in
responses to the sight of particular gestures in artworks.
This collaboration between art historians and neuroscientists has chal-
lenged the primacy of cognition in responses to art. They propose a theory
of empathetic response to artworks that is not purely introspective, intu-
itive or metaphysical but has a precise and definable material basis in the
brain. They maintain that a crucial element of aesthetic response consists
of the activation of embodied mechanisms encompassing the simulation of
actions, emotions and corporeal sensation. These mechanisms are mirroring
mechanisms and embodied simulation for empathetic responses to images in
general, and to works of visual arts in particular. This gives importance not
only to context and meaning in art but also looks for a response to works of
art that is the same for all humans.
If the studies mentioned above are concerned with artworks only, the analy-
sis of the broad field of visual culture as something that is interwoven with the
body is one of the recent incorporations in the interests of many researchers.
We can see the emergence of this matter in relation to what Moxey [31] sig-
nalled as the introduction of the problem of the ‘presence’ of the objects of
visual culture (of their power as agents) when carrying out research on them.
As an example of this, the statements of Belting [6] in Bild-Anthropologie can
be cited. This author affirms that visual artefacts are embedded in mediums
and that neither images nor mediums can be studied separately. This idea of
medium is a metaphor for the human body: visual artefacts are inscribed in
mediums just as inner images are inscribed in the human body. The medium
is thus a figure necessary to the agency of visual objects that are conceived
as something more than plain representations.
It can be said, however, that a full theoretical development of concepts such
as embodied simulation would be possible if a more complex relationship be-
tween visual studies and abduction studies were established. This relationship
should be established from a philosophical point of view, and also from that
of cognitive sciences, psychology of perception and visual argumentation. To
some extent this means that concepts like ‘embodied simulation’, ‘empathetic
response’ or ‘Pathosformel’ can be presented as interplay between disciplines
and, by extension, that both art history and visual studies are a cognitive niche
of interdisciplinary research. The interpretation of visual culture can be anal-
ysed as a cognitive process that can be applied to an individual, a collective, a
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groupor ahistorical period.Theactivity of interpretation canbepresentedboth
as a process and as the result of a process. In both cases cognitive abduction is
constantly present and may appear either as theoretical abduction (related to
logic and to symbolic inferences), or as model-based related to the exploitation
of models (pictures, photographs, diagrams, collages, etc.) or even as manip-
ulative abduction. Perception is a limited process. This implies the use of this
type of reasoning, also understood as epistemic change, for modelling the in-
corporation of new beliefs. The interpretative process and product, the bodily
involvement in visual culture experience and even visual culture itself, can be
understood as products that have an inferential structure or that even imply
an inferential play. Hence studies in abduction cannot be indifferent to visual
studies. The total evidence principle referred to by Eco (that it is impossible
to register all the potentially relevant information) transforms perception into
an abductive activity in itself. There is evidence for the consistency of this ap-
proach.Thedevelopmentof ‘image-basedhypothesis formation’ has ledauthors
like Magnani to consider abduction in terms of visual abduction. But the inte-
gration of visual abduction in the study of visual culture invites to explore a
path where there is still much to discover.
4 Manipulative Abduction and Mnemosyne
To many of the authors who have stressed the agency of visual culture, the
figure of Warburg emerges as some sort of ‘historiographic hero’. For further
details see Moxey [31]. In the field of archaeology, Shelley [39] stressed the im-
portant role played by the representation of visual images in the construction
of new hypotheses. Abductive reasoning is constantly used in archaeology to
discover archaeological remains and archaeological complexes. In the case of
this discipline the discovery of some objects can be taken as an index of
the existence of others that are absent. Abductive reasoning in archaeology
is used to discover new forms or material remains that would be shaped in
different ways depending on the associated assumptions. Abduction is thus
related to the form of the objects, to their structure, and to the analogical
inferences used in each case.
In Warburg’s research abduction is not used as a form of induction as
described by Reilly [34], neither it is understood as the invertedmodus ponens
described by Anderson [3]. It is seen as the heuristic form studied by Anderson
[2]. Warburg’s idea of Pathosformel, and his project of image argumentation
are based on the assumption that the heuristic he proposed helped to obtain
explanations with a certain inferential structure. In this sense, problems in
interpreting the meaning of images are similar to those in the interpretation
of texts, and of interactive discourse: it is impossible to escape the use of
inferential structures. For further details see González Navarro [18]. In both
cases the distinction between the hidden meanings of the data themselves
and the hidden meanings of the producers of those data is a large theoretical
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challenge as it was explained by Gabbay and Woods [14]. Warburg faced
this challenge. We propose here an interpretation of his project of the atlas
Mnemosyne according to which he offered a particular answer and a specific
expression of the theoretical challenge as we described it before.
The atlas of images Mnemosyne was the last ‘tool to see time’, the last
device Warburg worked on between 1924 until his death in 1929. It was based
on the intuition that a regulated redistribution, a problematized remontage of
the materials assembled during 30 years of research, could be great, heuristic
fertility. This atlas of images was thought in connection not only to the
theoretical manuscripts that accompanied the atlas elaboration, but also to
the books of Warburg’s library. For Warburg his library was not an ivory
tower but an experimental device that made out of the WarburgianDenkraum
a laboratory where machines to see time could be invented through action
on words, images and gestures. The organization of the books in the library
was designed by Warburg himself so that the reader would find not only the
books she or he was looking for, but also their unexpected ‘good neighbours’.
The black panels of the atlas Mnemosyne were a place where images were
disposed and composed and they constituted crucial elements in Warburg’s
talks. He was worried about how to present an argument whose elements were
not words or propositions but images that were distant in space and time. As
we said before, the atlas was an experimental device, a type of device where
the lecturer and his audience were surrounded by a multiplicity of images
that acted as visual indicators and not just as illustrations in the exposition
of the argument.
Didi-Huberman [8] affirms that Warburg found in the atlasMnemosyne the
device that his investigation had always been waiting for: a method capable of
manipulating as interpreting objects the images that themselves constituted
the objects to be interpreted in the first instance. The Warburgian analytical
space is based on a search for truth that transgresses the frontiers of knowing
and seeing, of discourse and image, of the intelligible and the sensitive. But
also because of that, it transgresses the canonical and deterministic models of
explanation. According to Didi-Huberman, Mnemosyne is a theoretical work
based on challenging the erudite explanation. It appears as a visual installa-
tion where that which cannot be explained in a deterministic way will have
to be shown, where an Übersicht (a synoptic view) could go beyond univocal
propositions, and establish a proper vision of the world. To put it in different
words, the atlas Mnemosyne was an ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’. At the same
time that Warburg established his practice, Wittgenstein established his rea-
son, a synoptic presentation of multiplicity valuable because of its heuristic
capacity to raise comparisons.
Atlas Mnemosyne is characterised by Didi-Huberman as inexhaustible be-
cause of its capacity to mount, dismount and remount constantly a corpus of
heterogeneous images in order to create unknown configurations and appre-
hend thanks to them unnoticed affinities or existing conflicts. Montage has
to be understood as a procedure that goes beyond the artistic practice and
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is able to open new spaces of thinking. As a consequence of all this, montage
reveals itself as a very useful and significant space in epistemic terms. It is
useful because it offers the spectator the possibility to conform, acquire or
select beliefs, and significant because that space is clearly inclined towards
an agent’s epistemic stage conceived as an individual activity that models it
as a consistent set of beliefs that can change by expansion and contraction.
According to this conception of belief revision the message, or in this case
the interpretation, has priority over the agent’s initial belief. However the
progressive observation of more elements demands the use of an abductive
reasoning process that finally turns into an operation that allows the emer-
gence of observations oriented to the epistemic change of our beliefs or inter-
pretations about the objects created by montage. In these spaces there exists
constantly and for each agent what Aliseda [1] has called abductive novelties
(that cause abductive expansion), and abductive anomalies (that can imply
the revision of previous beliefs or interpretations). That is the basis of the
rational foundations of the heuristic montages we are examining and inter-
preting as if they were situated and embedded cognitions. Because of it, this
exhibition space can be understood as an invitation to explore cognition un-
derstood as abductive cognition. As Walliser [46] affirms abduction leads to
the inference of hypotheses that cannot be classically deduced from the given
facts. Objects and spaces constructed by montage cannot be interpreted as
necessary deductions, they open a space for creativity and therefore, for ab-
duction. Inherent to montage is the assumption that abduction is a model of
epistemic change. Any individual, group or collective that places itself inside
this space will have to interpret through abduction.
The assumptions that encourage this conception of epistemic change con-
ceive of action as a device that provides otherwise unavailable information so
that the agent is able to solve problems by performing an abductive process
of generation or selection of hypotheses. Because of this, montage can be de-
fined as a mechanism that reinforces epistemic change through manipulative
abductions. In this type of abduction exemplified by montage, inferences are
mediated through actions that create external objects which produce new
affordances and through the detection of past affordances.
Warburg’s atlas Mnemosyne is a very clear example of the combination of
theoretical and manipulative abduction in the studies of visual culture but we
think that, in fact, this kind of reasoning is used continuously in these studies.
Could it be affirmed that montage is one of the basic activities performed
(physically and/or mentally) by specialists in visual culture?
It is unlikely that the disciplines concerned with the study of visual culture
can avoid the controversy between the supporters of internal cognition, who
think that psychological processes do not extend outside the head and can be
explained in isolation from their environment, and those of embedded cogni-
tion, according to whom cognition depends on external props and the structure
of the environment. For further details see Sprevak [40]. Our objective here was
not speculate or to adduce reasons for and against one position or the other.We
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have presented analogies in order to show that studies in visual culture have to
be seen as a field where cognitive abduction can be explored in the light of a
broad epistemic perspective.
Nevertheless there is an assumption in the field of studies dealing with visual
culture that has to be stated specifically. The problem of interpretation seems
to be deeply rooted in these disciplines. This may be true, but that should also
be the place assigned to abduction if we understand it as inseparable from the
cognitive process by which we produce and revise interpretations. As a result,
abduction could be presented as the logical pattern inherent in interpretation,
thus answering one of the unresolved questions of the so called philosophy of
interpretation.
The integration of the tradition of the studies in visual culture (represented
by art history and visual studies) into studies of abduction would mean the in-
troduction of an interpretative phenomenon that clearly reunites the represen-
tational and inferential components present in reasoning. Brandom [7] pointed
out the differences between the position of Descartes and Leibniz in Enlight-
enment. On the one hand, Descartes divided the world into res cogitans and
res extensa, thus converting the possession of representational contents into an
explanatory but inexplicable instance. In contrast, Leibniz and Spinoza were
concerned with what indicated the fact that a thing represented another tak-
ing into account the inferential significance of the representation. This should
be elucidated through inferential relations. One of the main challenges since
then has been to find how to define representational properties according to in-
ferential ones. Abduction is part of this controversy, and it transforms radically
the notion of ‘interpretation’ as González Navarro has stated [19] [17]. The con-
sideration of the correctness of an inference is not a logical or a formal one; it is
a hermeneutic matter, pragmatic and contextual. As Vega Reñón argues [44],
the legitimacy of an inference manifests itself in relation to the set of beliefs
actualised by the agent in order to cope with a situation. In this sense, the suc-
cess of an inference depends on the intentional and epistemic attitudes of the
agent. As a result, the justification of the inference becomes as complex as the
rationalising of human action can be.
The inferential pattern of abduction would harmonize with interpretation
understood as a form of cognition that is used, for example, in the production
of new interpretations or even in the production of hypotheses leading to the de-
velopment of new theories. Hence, the production of theories is an intrinsically
interpretative process (conceive, T ; transform T into T1; extend T1; reject T1
in favour of T2; producing, then, Tn. . . ). The acquisition of a language and the
historicity of our comprehensionpreformour cognitions through time individu-
ally and collectively. The ampliative effects observed in IBE are the result of the
application of a reasoningmodel that is integrated into the action of interpreta-
tion.The inferential parameters thatdetermine the logical relationshipbetween
explanandum, the explanans and abductive explanation are inseparable parts
of an abductive competence which is shared in a theoretical and amanipulative
sense.
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en Teoŕıa de la Ciencia. Trotta, Madrid (2004)
39. Shelley, C.: Visual abductive reasoning in archaeology. Philosophy of Science 53,
278–301 (1996)
40. Sprevak, M.: Inference to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Studies in His-
tory and Philosophy of Science 41, 353–362 (2010)
41. Thagard, P.: The best explanation: Criteria for theory choice. The Journal of
Philosophy 75, 76–92 (1978)
42. Tursman, R. (ed.): Peirce’s Theory of Scientific Discovery. Indiana University
Press, Bloomington (1987)
43. Vega, J.: Del pasado al futuro de la historia del arte en la universidad española.
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